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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces CollabSec, a new tool for studying risk assessment in a collaborative
online environment. Players decide how to allocate limited resources to apply controls to various assets
to mitigate threats and protect a network. A set of rules determines the impact of these decisions on a
variety of risk outcomes in an organization. The game will be used to teach and train students and
employees, as well as perform empirical research.
Keywords: Information Security Education, Games, Collaboration, Risk Management, Virtual Teams
INTRODUCTION
Information security is a critical and costly issue for managers in business organizations. It has
been estimated that the cost to reconstitute a single lost or damaged record after a security breach is
between $90 and $205 (Kouns and Minoli 2010).

Security-related activities like risk assessment and

policy implementation are highly complex and require collaboration between all affected stakeholders.
Given the limited availability of time, financial resources, and employee-power, information security
1
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planning and execution demands coordination and collaboration with specialists within the IT domain
(Werlinger et al. 2009). An earlier series of interviews with security specialists showed that security
assessments are high in task interdependence with others and often require a daily exchange of
information between decision makers (Knapp et al. 2005).
Previous research has examined learning principles designed for educating end users on security
policies and procedures (e.g. Puhakainen and Siponen 2010), but to our knowledge, there have been no
studies that investigate collaborative information technology risk management and the complexities of
making necessary decisions required to implement countermeasures necessary for protecting
information in such an environment. There have been a few previous games developed for studying
network security and risk assessment principles (Irvine et al. 2005; Surdu et al. 2003; Uiterwijk 1999).
CyberProtect was one of the first and won several awards. However, CyberProtect was a single-player
game and is not adaptable to different scenarios (Uiterwijk 1999). MAADNET is also a single-player
game, though different scenarios can be incorporated (Surdu et al. 2003). CyberCIEGE does allow some
customization and multiple players, but is rather complex and therefore has limited potential for the
limited time-span of most educational exercises and research experiments (Irvine et al. 2005).
StrikeCOM (Twitchell et al. 2005) allowed groups and had some capabilities for customization;
however it is based on a military scenario. Our aim with this research effort is to move towards a more
general information security platform that allows for collaboration and customization.
This paper describes the development of an online game that simulates a typical local area
network found in business organizations, the assets residing on the network, the threats that potentially
exploit those assets, and a series of controls that could be used to protect the assets. In addition to
reinforcing concepts on risk assessment, the game also requires the collaboration of players seeking to
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implement a rigorous security program with limited resources. We describe the main aspects of the
game and briefly discuss future research to be conducted using the game.
COLLABSEC DESCRIPTION
CollabSec is a web-based multiplayer security strategy game created using Ruby on Rails, an
open-source web framework for application development. It is designed for scenario flexibility and
multiplayer collaboration.

Through an administrative interface, shown in Figure A.1, a scenario

designer can create an information security scenario for one or more players. To allow for many
scenarios, the game board, which players use for reference, is a simple image. The scenario designer
places positions on this image, which represent organizational assets on which players will place
controls. For each position, the designer chooses possible security controls (e.g., firewall, intrusion
detection, training, etc.) that the players can choose to purchase during the game. The designer also
chooses the number of players, their names or roles, starting instructions for each player, the number of
turns, and the amount of initial resources for the group and other features (see Table 1 for customizable
features). For research purposes, additional manipulations may take place outside of the game itself,
such as group member familiarity and proximity.
Table 1. CollabSec Customizable Features
Number of Players
Starting Resource Levels
Number and Type of Controls
Number and Type of Outcomes or Goals
Player instructions

Number of Turns
Number and Type of Assets
Number, Type and Likelihood of Attacks
Player Roles
End of Turn Feedback

Finally, the designer will create a set of probability-based rules that determine what happens
after each round. A rule has several components: an attack, an asset, a control, outcomes, and two
probabilities (See Appendix B for rule template). A repository of these rules and components (defined
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below) is currently under development based on previous works and industry materials (Kouns and
Minoli 2010; Microsoft 2006; Richardson 2011; Stoneburner et al. 2002; Uiterwijk, 1999).
Attack. The attack specifies the name of the attack and the plain language description displayed to
players when a successful attack occurs. There may be many rules for a single attack since the same
attack may happen on multiple assets or may be controlled by multiple controls. There would be no rule
for illogical asset-attack combinations such as a social engineering attack on a router.
Asset. The assets are the potential targets of the attacks. There will be assets representing people, data,
information systems, hardware, and network components.
Control. In each rule, the control specifies what control must be in place on the specified asset for
vulnerability to be mitigated and an attack to be thwarted. Players may choose different quality levels
(e.g., high or low) for some controls.
Outcomes. The outcomes are the impacts to the system and various aspects of the organization if an
attack is not stopped by the control. There may be multiple outcomes. The outcomes may be related to
player roles in such a way that players either compete or cooperate. Each outcome is represented by a
score, when a successful attack occurs, the score is decremented by the outcome.
Probabilities. There are two probabilities associated with the rule: the probability of the attack being
successful given that the appropriate control is not in place, and the probability of the attack being
successful given that the control is in place (i.e. residual risk). For each rule, the game will determine if
the rule applies to any of the current assets, and if the appropriate control is in place. The rules then The
probabilities are then used to determine if the attack is successful, and scores for the outcomes will be
adjusted accordingly.
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Playing the game
Currently, Figure A.2 depicts CollabSec configured as a three-person game although multiple
configurations are possible. The players include a security manager, an operations manager, and an
accountant. Each of these players is given instructions specific to his or her assigned role.

The

accountant is instructed to minimize the financial impact of the purchase of controls and any successful
attacks, while the operations manager must minimize the impact of controls and attacks on business
operations. The security manager, on the other hand, must maintain the security of the system by
maximizing controls given the allotted resources.
After logging in, the players are presented with the board and a chat window as shown in Figure
A.2. For each of the positions on the board, representing assets, players must collaboratively decide
which controls to place on which positions. Each control they place uses part of a finite set of resources,
restricting the number and quality of controls that can be used. Once finished with their choices, they
submit their choices and the game, using the rules described above, evaluates their decisions and gives
feedback based on which attacks were successful. The players may use this feedback in successive turns
of the game in order to meet the objective as outlined by a particular scenario. For example, in the
scenario described above, the objective of the security manager is to minimize risk to an acceptable level
while maximizing the protection to the assets at the least cost. The rules provide the descriptions that
comprise the feedback. An example feedback might say the following:
“Using social engineering an attacker successfully convinced your helpdesk agent to reset a
password. The attacker was then able to obtain credit card numbers for 500 customers. You
lose X financial points for the money required to send notices to those customers, provide
them with fraud protection and reimburse the credit card company for the replacement of
cards.

You lose Y security points your company’s security posture has been seriously
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degraded. You lose Z operations points because until you install new controls you have to
issue your customers telephone passwords they will use when calling the helpdesk and your
customer service times skyrocket.”
The players then see the board for a second turn in which they can make changes based on the feedback.
This cycle continues for as many turns as specified in the game scenario.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND PLANNED RESEARCH
CollabSec can be used in a variety of Information Systems and Information Assurance courses. It
will also be appropriate for use for training employees in a corporate environment. However, CollabSec
is expected to provide more than educational value; it is also planned to be used as a tool for conducting
research on a range of different topics. One potential research question involves transactive memory
and security planning. When individuals interact in groups and work toward a common goal, they likely
draw upon transactive memory resources, which refers to the domain-specific knowledge allocated
across members of a group and a shared awareness of who knows what (Wegner 1986). The group
benefits from transactive memory when members’ knowledge sets are complementary, able to be
retrieved, and communicated in a fashion that is relatable to other group members. The end result is that
group members are able to supplement their own limited memories and experiences with external
information provided by (presumably) trusted others. The use of transactive memory resources would
seem to be beneficial within the context of security planning and implementation. For instance, it is
unlikely that a single manager will be knowledgeable about all potential security threats, so carrying out
risk assessment activities should be undertaken with a team of security professionals and end users with
complementary knowledge bases (Straub and Welke 1998). We intend to investigate this possibility.
Similarly, we intend to compare performance across group environments, particularly between
collocated and dispersed groups. Any process gains and process losses due to the communicative
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environment could have undue influence on group collaboration, especially when the group is faced
with a resource allocation task (Qureshi and Vogel 2001). Like most other business functions,
information security planning is increasingly being coordinated across computer-mediated means, so
CollabSec provides an opportunity to test existing computer-mediated communication and group
collaboration theories within the InfoSec context.
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APPENDIX A - CollabSec SCREENSHOTS

Figure A.1: CollabSec administration interface

Figure A.2: CollabSec Game Board/User Interface
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APPENDIX B – RULE TEMPLATE
Table B.1. Sample Rule Set.
Outcomes*
sec
op fin
Social engineering Users
Training – medium
10
3
10
SQL Injection
DB
Code review
10
5
10
*sec: security outcome; op: operation outcome; fin: financial outcome
**control: probability of successful attack given control; no: probability of
control. The sum of control probability and no probability is 1.0.
Attack

Asset

Control

Probabilities**
control no
.7
.3
.9
.1
successful attack given no
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